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This study tests the effects of virtuous CEOs on corporate social responsibility views 
(narrow vs broad). Using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique, we find that 
virtuous CEOs correlated positively with a broad view of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). We also examine the moderating role the board f directors plays in the relationship 
between virtuous CEOs and CSR but finds no positive association. Our results indicate that 
CEOs matter and that their virtuous values may be amajor source of motivation for their 








The relationship between virtuous CEOs and corporate social responsibility 
 
Since the creation of the modern corporation academic and business persons have 
debated corporate social responsibility (CSR) issue (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Berglöf and 
von Thadden, 2000). Two theoretical views in this area of study have been presented as 
opposing and contradictory (Adams, Licht, and Savage, 2008): narrow and broad. At one 
extreme is the narrow CSR view which regards a corporation as a nexus of bilateral contracts 
between the suppliers of different asset, where the stockholders hold a predominant position. 
As Milton Friedman wrote, “there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to 
use its resources and engage activities designed to increase its profits so long as it … engages 
in open and free competition, without deception or fraud (Friedman, 1962: 133). On the other 
hand, the broad CSR view asserts that managers have a duty to all individual or groups that 
contribute to wealth creating capacity and activities, and who are therefore also its potential 
beneficiaries and/or risk bearers (Clarkson, 1995). These individuals or groups include 
stockholders but also non-stockholder stakeholders, such as customer, supplier, employees, 
and community.  
Most research has centred around evaluating and judging these alternative ways of 
understanding CSR, with the objective of taking a position that favors one approach or the 
other (Aglietta, 2000; Licht, 2004). However, this research has not done well in elucidating 
why companies differ in their CSR orientation (Adams et al., 2008; Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; 
Winn and Brenner, 2001). Accordingly, the first objective of the current study is to examine 
whether virtuous values of CEOs influence whether CSR is reflected in the company’s vision 
statement.  CSR. 
A firm’s intentions and actions regarding CSR are not made by an abstract 




echelon theory wherein a company’s decisions reflect the personal preferences of its top 
managers (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Therefore, an 
understanding of CEOs’ values, (including the virtues to which they subscribe) may help 
explain why companies differ in their CSR orientation (i.e. whether the orientation is norrow 
or broad;(Adams et al. 2008; Winn and Brenner, 2001).  
The influence of the CEO’s values on corporate decisions is a topic of interest since 
Hambrick and Brandon (1988) and Hambrick and Mason (1984). Since thie earlier work, 
studies have focused on the impact of managers’ values on strategic choices (Kotey and 
Meredith, 1997), on the role such values play in the processes of corporate evaluation of 
social questions (Sharfman, 1997), on the ethical dimension of decision-making (Fritzsche 
and Oz, 2007), on corporate social responsibility (Camelo-Ordaz and Frende-Vega, 2005; 
DiNorcia and Tigner, 2000; Hemingway, 2005), and on c rporate philanthropy (Jones, 2004). 
However, there notable scarcity of empirical work. Some authors call for more studies on this 
topic, with the object of improving the understanding of the role that top managers’ values 
play in firm-stakeholder relationships (Bird, 2001; Winn and Brenner, 2001).  
The connection between top managers’ values and companies’ decisions depends on 
the power CEOs wield (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Prior studies do not address this 
effect. Therefore, the second objective and contribution of this paper is to analyze whether or 
not the strength of the association between the CEO’s values and CSR depends on the power 
of the CEO; examining the composition and structure of the company’s board of directors can 
help determine this association (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  
A third contribution the current paper makes is using the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) technique to measure corporate social responsibility. The measurement of corporate 
social responsibility orientation is a difficult task and very few studies have attempted it. 




differences between sectors in the attention given to  various stakeholders by firms. They 
suggest that DEAcan be used to assess whether the companies are being responsible to all of 
their stakeholders (Bendheim et al., 1998). The DEA resolves many of the conceptual 
problems associated with studyinga company’s relationships with its stakeholders using  a 
single measure (Bendheim et al., 1998; Jones, 1995). 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Narrow and Broad views of CSR 
The debate on CSR polarizes between two theoretical perspectives (Letza, Sun, and 
Kirkbridge, 2004; Vinten, 2001): narrow and broad. The defenders of the narrow CSR 
perspective hold that the company should focus on the building the wealth of its owners, the 
stockholders. The normative condition here is that m nagers must always act to maximize the 
profits of the firm since this is presumed to be th goal of the stockholders (Berman, Wicks, 
Kotha, and Jones, 1999). However, the non-stockholder stakeholders may control key 
resources that the company must have to implement its s rategic decisions. Since firms face 
both conflicting claims from their stakeholders and limited resources, they must attend to 
those groups that are best positioned  to help or hinder them from achieving corporate goals 
(Freeman, 1984). The non-stockholder stakeholders ar  thus seen as part of the economic 
context that must be managed by the company to ensur  it  profits and, ultimately, the returns 
to its stockholders. Attention to the non-stockholder stakeholders is thus instrumental and 
contingent on the value that these entities represent for the company (Jones, 1995). In 
essence, in this approach the ultimate social responsibility of the firm is maximizing 
stockholders’ wealth and the interests of the remaining stakeholders are only satisfied to the 




The other extreme is the broad CSR perspective. Its principal claim is that the 
company, in its management and governance, has an important responsibility to all its 
stakeholders and not just to its stockholders.Here the aim is to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of the profits and costs derived from the company’s activities. This view widens 
the scope of the company’s responsibility toward groups not considered a company 
responsibility within the narrow CSR approach (Evan and Freeman, 1993; Kaler, 2003). The 
intention is not that the narrow CSR view is to displace the stockholders from their privileged 
position: rather, the goal is that the rest of the stakeholders are to receive the same type and 
degree of attention as the shareholders (Kaler, 2003). In this vein, Evan and Freeman (1993) 
made the Kantian recommendation that managers’ have t e responsibility to consider all 
stakeholders as a purpose of the firm and not consider them as only a means to achieve the 
firm’s objectives. These claims carry with them certain implications when it comes to 
defining and understanding the governance of corporations. Firstly, the company is a vehicle 
for coordinating the interests of all its stakeholders (Evan and Freeman, 1993). Secondly, 
certain multi-fiduciary duties are attributable to the company’s managers, in the sense that 
they must act in conformity with the interests of all the stakeholders, and one set of interests 
does not have prima face priority over any other (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
Nevertheless, every company has limited resources which prevents it from satisfying 
all the demands of all of its stakeholders. From an ethical point of view, companies cannot be 
forced to pay out more than they are really able to from the resources they possess. Given this 
reality, the claim of the broad CSR perspective is that, within the boundaries of the resources 
available to it, the company should satisfy the needs of all of the stakeholders to the 
maximum extent possible, without there being inequality between them (Kaler, 2003).  
 




Various scholars refer to values as broad attitudes (McGuire, 1969:151), “conceptions 
of the desirable” (Kluckhohn, 1951: 395), “beliefs about desirable or undesirable ways of 
behaving or desirable end states” (Feather, 1995: 1135), and “cognitive constructs that 
explain individual preferences” (Renner, 2003: 127). Despite the lack of consensus on the 
meaning of the term personal values, it does appear that there is unanimity on certain aspects 
of the topic (Batson and Powell, 2003; Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004). Two of these aspects are 
especially relevant for this study. The first is the observation that values guide individuals in 
the assessment and selection of behaviors and events, l ading several scholars to suggest that 
managers’ behavior itself is essentially the result of their values (Renner, 2003). The second 
significant aspect relates to the structure of values. The number of values that an individual 
possesses is relatively limited, and each value has its own importance. The importance 
attributed to each value constitutes the individual’s system or structure of values, and it is the 
system as a whole that really influences the individual’s behaviour (Feather 1995; Schwartz, 
1994). Given that the system of values that affects an individual’s actions, the study of 
isolated values is not very significant (Schwartz, 1994). There are several types of values 
(e.g. Rokeach, 1973, Schwartz, 1992), but in this study we focus on virtuous ones. Although 
still in the early stages of development, systematic investigations of virtuous phenomena are 
beginning to emerge (e.g. Dutton et al., 2002).  
In general terms, virtuous values imply the internalization of moral rules that produce 
social harmony (Baumeister and Exline, 1999; Rutledge and Karim, 1999) and, therefore, 
emphasize altruism, cooperation, and concern for the welfare of others (Cheng, Peng, and 
Saparito, 2002). Hence they are reflected in attitudes of concern for others(Gandal, Roccas, 
Sagiv, and Wrzesniewski, 2005; Kanungo, 2001) as well as in acceptance and tolerance when 
this behaviour is not a part of their job or work responsibilities (McNeely and Meglino, 




disposed to evaluate costs and benefits carefully when processing social information 
because....(explain rationale please). In support, K rsgaard, Meglino, and Lester (1997) found 
that individuals exemplifying virtuous behavior tended to be  less concerned with  personal 
gains compared to their less virtous behaving counterparts. and any risks associated with 
those gains. Similarly, Batson and Shaw (1991) suggest that people who strongly endorse 
virtuous values engage in helping others even when t re are material incentives to do 
otherwise.  
Whetstone (2005) notes that top managers with virtuous values can resist pressures, 
even at a great sacrifice. Harrell and Harrison (1994) show that not all managers are 
motivated by self-interest and that they are therefore ready to sacrifice personal rewards in 
order to benefit others. This does not mean that these managers do not seek to obtain profits, 
but rather that they will do this within the ethical precepts of equity and justice (Schneider, 
Ehrhart, Mayer, Saltz, and Niles-Jolly, 2005). In a study of 174 working professionals 
attending part-time graduate programs, Fritzshe and Oz (2007) reported a positive association 
between self virtuous and ethical behaviour. This explains why some executives act in one 
way when a different option is the one that clearly favours their own and/or their their 
company’s financial interests (Rutledge and Karim, 1999). Principles for ethical behavior 
likely guide CEOs who have this value orientation and, consequently, these CEOs will apply 
the same weighting of importance to the interests of all their stakeholders before undertaking 
a course of action.  
Thus, there seems to be a compatible relationship between broad CSR and virtuous 
values of managers.  






The Moderating Role of the Board 
Although CEOs obviously direct their company, the board of directors as a 
supervising and monitoring body can reduce the ability of the CEO to reflect his or her 
personal preferences in the decisions and actions of the company (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996). For this reason, the specific composition and structure of the board can exercise 
influence on the discretion of the CEO, and that one effect of this is to modify the 
relationship between the CEO’s virtuous values and the orientation of the corporate 
governance. The question that has received the most attention from researchers with respect 
to the structure of the board has been that of duality, whereinthe CEO is also the Chairman of 
the Board. In the current study, the composition of the board refers to the types of directors 
and the board’s size. 
 
Types of Directors 
The literature has traditionally distinguished two types of directors—executive or 
internal directors and external or independent members—and the balance between these two 
types represents one dimension of the board since not all boards enjoy the same degree of 
independence in controlling and evaluating the CEO (Mallette and Fowler, 1992). While both 
internal and external directors are responsible for overseeing corporate decision-making, 
most researchers and advocates of board reform typically assume that internal directors will 
be more conciliatory toward their CEO. A board dominated by internal directors will always 
face problems in its degree of control since the CEO is in a strong position to influence an 
executive director’s career advancement within the firm (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). In 
contrast, outside directors tend to evaluate organizational decisions more objectively and they 
may be less willing to accommodate the CEO’s personal preferences regarding corporate 




H2: The positive relationship between a virtuous CEO and adoption of a broad 
CSR view is stronger when inside versus outside directors dominate the board.  
 
Size of the Board 
Research in social psychology suggests that a team of excessive size would lead to a 
dispersion of responsibilities within the group and to social slackness (Golden and Zajac, 
2001). Several authors have argued that serious problems of participation can arise among the 
members of a large board, and that this situation leads to diminished motivation for board 
members to perform their duties (Judge and Zeithaml, 1991). There may also be serious 
problems of coordination, communication, and cohesion among members—it may prove 
difficult to maintain fluid interpersonal relationships, a situation that may lead to the 
formation of independent subgroups. All these factors would have a negative effect on the 
board’s ability to carry out effective deliberations and to adequately supervise the CEO’s 
decisions (Zahra, Neubaum, and Huse, 2000). Accordingly, if larger boards face these kinds 
of problems, the CEO with a large board should tend to have more power over the board and 
to be better able to reflect his/her own values in the firm’s decisions and policies.  
H3: The positive relationship between virtuous CEO and a adoption of a broad 
CSR view is stronger when the board is large rather than small. 
 
Duality 
Duality exists when the chairman of the board and the CEO are the same individual. 
Having additional titles can serve as a source of structural power, with the additional title of 
board chair consolidating the power held by the CEO (Finkelstein, 1992). Some theorists 
have argued that this situation diminishes the ability of the board to fulfil its monitoring 




CEO’s decisions (Daily and Johnson, 1997). Several authors have suggested that the CEO 
may use the position of leadership on the board to dictate the agenda of meetings and 
otherwise minimize dissent (Langevoort, 2001). Such a oncentration of power in the person 
of the CEO is not likely to enhance the ability of the board to operate independently of 
management and to monitor CEO decision-making as effectively as it should. Therefore, the 
CEO might be more likely to impose his/her personal values on the decisions taken in the 
name of the company.   
H4: The positive relationship between a virtuous CEO and adoption of a broad 
CSR view is stronger under conditions of duality versus non-duality. 
 
 Method 
Sample and Data 
The study’s target population comprised all firms in the 2003 Standard & Poor’s 500 
Index. The Kinder Lynder and Domini (KLD) database for 2003 provided the data on the 
degree to which firms attend to the interests of their various stakeholders. The advantages of 
this database are fully explored in the literature (Bartkus and Glassman, 2008; Coombs and 
Gilley, 2005; Mattingly and Berman, 2006), but include....(provide a sampling of these 
advantages). Consistent with this past research the curr nt study concentrates on the 
following items: relationships with the community, attitude with respect to the natural 
environment, characteristics of the product, corporate governance, and relationships with 
employees, which respectively represent  five groups of stakeholders: the general community, 
ecologists, customers, stockholders, and employees. 
Of the total number of firms, companies whose CEO was appointed in 2002 or later 
were deleted from the sample, assuming that a term of at least one year is necessary to 




his/her company (Gabarro, 1987). Further, companies that, for reasons of internal policies, 
told the researchers that they did not respond to any type of interview or survey were not 
included. The definitive sample is therefore composed of 438 companies. 
To obtain information on the values of CEOs and on the structure and composition of 
the board, a questionnaire was sent to those CEOs in the study sample. Of the total 
questionnaires sent, 61 CEOs responded. This rate of response is in line with responses 
obtained in similar studies and is considered acceptable when the unit of analysis is the CEO 
(Agle et al., 1999).  
 
Measures 
Independent variable: CEOs’ values. We choose items that are customarily associated 
with virtuous behaviour (Bird, 2001; Flynn, 2008; Mendoca, 2001; Whetstone, 2005).  
Specifically, the following values were included: helpful, social justice, a world of peace and 
equality. CEOs responded by indicating how important each of these values were “as a 
guiding principle in their lives” on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1: not at all 
important to 5: very important. 
 
Dependent variable: CSR orientation. The DEA was used to assess CSR orientation. 
This multidimensional assessment is possible for tw basic reasons (Bendheim et al., 1998; 
Jones, 1995). First, the DEA allows for the empirical analysis of numerous dimensions 
simultaneously, such as the relationships of companies with their various stakeholders 
groups.  Second, broad CSR can be assimilated to a Pareto-optimal function (Bendheim et al., 
1998) because companies are capable of maximizing the stakeholders’ interests (outputs) 




The DEA is a mathematical scheduling technique that allows the relative efficiency of 
the use of resources to be determined from various inputs and outputs. The technique 
identifies the frontier of best practices (BP). In this study, the BP companies are those that 
follow a broad CSR because they have proved capable of maximizing the interests of all the 
stakeholders with the resources available. In contrast, the companies falling outside this 
frontier follow in the line with a narrow CSR view. The latter companies only attend to the 
interests of certain groups of stakeholders—generally those referred to as the “primary” 
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). 
In this research, the outputs of a firm are the scores for each dimension of KLD 
(stakeholder groups) that it receives. They range between -2, suggesting poor stakeholder’s 
attention, and +2, indicating superior stakeholder’s attention. Because the application of the 
DEA is not possible when negative values are applicable, the scores obtained by the KLD 
were transferred to a Likert scale of 5 points, where 1 represents the worst value (-2) and 5 
the best (+2). In a broad CSR view the most desirable situation is to have the highest possible 
scores for all stakeholders; thus, those valuations designate the outputs of the analysis 
(Bendheim et al., 1998). 22 
As Bendheim et al. (1998) recognize, the selection of the inputs is difficult because 
the scope and amount of resources the companies utilize when obtaining those outputs is 
complicated and hard to measure. However, given that the DEA needs at least one input, a 
score of 1 is assigned to all the companies (Bendheim et al. 1998). Consequently, the DEA 
model used in this research is oriented toward the outputs and the measurements produced are 
measurements of efficiency of results. To value the corporate governance orientations that a 
company follows a linear program is solved whose principal result is a scale greater than or 
equal to 1, denoted as φ x, that measures the “radial” expansion of the company “X”. The 






















































0,,,,, ≥SOPxSCOxSGxSCxSExxλ  
Where: 
E, C, G, CO, and P represent the scores of company “i” for each of the 
stakeholder groups: employees, customers, ecologists, community, and stockholders. 
 xφ  is a decision variable that measures the proportion that company “X” lacks 
in order to be BP. 
iλ  is a decision variable that expresses the weightin of company “i” in the 
convex combination of the BP companies against which company “x” is compared. 
SEx, SCx, SGx, SCOx, and SPx are decision variables that represent the deficits 
of the scores of company “X” beyondxφ . 




Following Bendheim et al. (1998), we define a broad CSR view as the ratio between 
the aggregate scores of all the dimensions of stakehold rs and the aggregate scores of the BP 












where TSCOREx = E+C+G+CO+P, such that: 10 ≤≤ DEASCOREx . 
 
Thus, if the DEASCORE = 1, company X is BP, and therefore follows a broad CSR 
view. However, if the DEASCORE is ≠ 1, company X is not BP and, in consequence, its 
CSR is oriented toward the stockholders (narrow approach). 
 
Moderator Variables: Composition and structure of the board. 
Board size. This variable is measured by the number of active members who 
comprised the board of directors of the company. 
 Type of directors: Several studies note that the percentages of inside directors who 
are members of the board determine the composition of the board. Since the composition is 
measured by percentage (number of inside directors/total board members), its value falls 
between 0 and 100. 
Duality. Duality is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if CEO duality exists and 0 
if different individuals hold the two posts. 
 




The study controls for firm size. Larger firms are more publicly visible, which may 
oblige them to operate under a broad CSR perpective so as not to be penalized by the 
marketplace (Waddock, 2002). The Napierian logarithm of the number of employees is the 
functional form for the size of the company.  
 
Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the results of the correlation analysis. As 
reported in this table, the mean value of the Broad CSR variable is 0.82, which shows that 
most of the companies, whether for narrow or broad CSR reasons, attend to a wide range of 
stakeholder groups. These results are in the line wth Walker (2002) who contends that 
around 15% of firms understand the responsibility toward their various stakeholders. Further, 
a large number of the companies that comprise the sample have boards dominated by outside 
directors (M = 82). As could be expected, virtuous values of the CEO relate significantly to 
broad CSR.  
 
Table 1 about here. 
 
The binary logit regression technique tested the relationship between virtuous values 
of the CEO and broad CSR, moderated by the composition and structure of the board.Testing 
hypothesis 1 was relatively straightforward. Virtuous values were entered into the model as 
the independent variable. To test moderation (hypotheses 2-4), a moderated regression 
analysis were run which included all interaction terms between each of the moderating 
variables (i.e. size of board, type of directors, and duality) and the virtuous values. The results 
in Table 2 show strong support for hypothesis 2 (p < 0.001), suggesting that CEOs with 




their stakeholders, with no one group predominating. Unexpectedly, the moderating effect of 
the size of the board, type of directors, and duality re not significant for any of those 
variables. In other words, the linkage between the CEO’s values and adoption of a broad CSR 
mandate is not moderated by the composition and structure of the company’s board of 
directors. Therefore, from the results obtained, hypotheses 2-4 cannot be accepted. 
 
 
Table 2 about here. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This research sets out to achieve two main two objectives: first, to examine whether 
CEOs’ virtuous values influence CSR orientation; and second, to analyze whether the 
composition and structure of the board of directors moderates the strength of this relationship. 
Regarding the first objective, the study has tested empirically and confirmed that CEOs who 
hold virtuous values will prefer to satisfy all the groups that have a legitimate stake in the 
company, without one group taking priority over theothers (broad CSR orientation). These 
results are in line with those obtained by Fritzsche (1995) and Morris, Rehbein, Hosseini, and 
Armacost (1995), who associated the ethical behaviour of companies with managers who 
hold virtuous values. Also, notes why firms not only focus on profits but which considers 
factors such as social, environmental, and economic costs in business decision making 
(Lampman, 2005). 
The results of the current study suggest that CEOs’ values should figure prominently 
when analysing the influence of corporate leaders on organizational decisions and results. In 




of virtuous CEOs to affect a firm’s orientation and outcomes (regardless of organizational or 
board characteristics). On the other hand, the literature on upper echelons has frequently 
focused on studying the demographic variables of top managers. However, given that their 
values are important, the introduction of these psychological variables into the model could 
alleviate some of the limitations associated with upper echelons theory, as several authors 
have proposed (Canella and Monroe, 1997; Priem, Lyon, and Dess 1999).  
In respect to this study’s second objective, assessing  the moderating role of structure 
and composition of the board, this study cannot affirm that boards dominated by outside 
directors, with a relatively small number of members, or in which the CEO is not also the 
chairman, reduce the discretion of the CEO to govern the company according to his or her 
personal values. On this point the literature demonstrates that CEOs attempt to maintain their 
autonomy and therefore usually respond to the threat of greater control and supervision 
(Westphal, 1998). To retain this autonomy they may use different tactics such as maintaining 
friendly relationships or forming “stable alliances” with particular key directors (Maitlis, 
2004). In this vein, Deutsch (2005) maintains that e CEO always dominates the board of 
directors independently of the board’s composition and structure. Thus, one could expect that 
the board members would not have any influence on the adoption of critical decisions such as 
CSR orientation (Kanungo, 2001). 
Further, the results obtained here support the belif held by some authors that the 
CEO is the most powerful organizational actor, setsthe tone of the corporation in its totality 
(Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman, and Yammarino, 2004), and is the undisputed leader of 
the company (Norburn, 1989). Thus, the influence of the CEO should be an important 
element in the study of upper echelons. Although examination of the role of the CEO in 




demonstrate that the CEO has the power to affect th decisions of the firm and, specifically, 
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Table  1: Number of observations, means, standard deviation (s.d.) and correlations of all 
variables 
Variable N Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Broad CSR 61 0.82 .388 1      
2. Virtuous values  61 2.41 0.78 .61**  1     
3. Duality 61 0.72 0.45 -.20 -.07  1    
4. Board size 61 10.59 2.78 .16 .06 .07 1   
5. % outside directors 61 81.81 13.31 -.09 .06 -.06 .03 1  
6. Nº of employees 61 35867.66 54711.27 -.18 -.06 .18 .11 0.15 1 




Table 2 Logit regression results (dependent variable: Broad CSR) 
 Parameter Estimate (β) Wald  X2 Probability ≥ X2 




% outside directors 
VV * Duality 
VV * Board size 
VV * % outside directors 
Nº of employees 
 










Overall X2 – Model’s Goodness of Fit = 25.80 ** 
** p < 0.001 
  * p < 0.05 
 
 
 
